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SUSTAINABILITY OF WATER AND SANITATION SYSTEMS
TODAY, SANITARY CONDITIONS in rural Venezuela are
typical of those to be found in most developing countries
in the tropics.  Major infectious diseases, such as malaria,
hepatitis, river blindness, leishmaniasis, tuberculosis,
Chagas, and cholera, are all present, and in some cases on
the increase.  The majority of the population lacks access
to clean drinking water and adequate facilities for excre-
ment disposal contributing to high morbidity rates due to
parasitic diseases.
Ironically, in the two or three decades following WW II,
a veritable revolution in rural sanitation was achieved
under the direction of Dr. Arnaldo Gabaldon (1909-90),
the internationally- known physician and academic, who
created and led an exemplary anti-malaria and rural
sanitation program which became a model for public
health administrators all over the world.
Under Gabaldon’s tutelage, Venezuela became the first
tropical country to apply DDT for malaria control on a
massive scale.  A newly created army of professional
sanitary inspectors and hygienist fanned out, often on
mule back or in dug-out canoes, to bring a message of
hope and a kit bag of the latest public health measures to
the remotest corners of the country.
Initial results were rapid and dramatic.  The mortality
rate from malaria dropped from more than 100 per 100,000
population to less than 10 within a decade. This same
figure was reduced to 0.5 by 1955 (Ramirez, 1987). The
combination of this technological breakthrough and
Gabaldon’s administrative and organizational genius
enabled the country to practically eradicate malaria by
the 1960’s. The same spray that killed mosquitos also
killed flies thereby reducing the transmission of intestinal
parasites.
The sanitary engineers soon followed to supervise the
construction of latrines, sewers, water supply systems
and even low-cost, rural houses. The net result of these
and other measures was to reduce the crude death rate
from 10.2 per thousand in 1950 to 5.5 in 1980.  This,
coupled with a rise in the birth rate, triggered a demo-
graphic explosion which caused the annual average
intercensal growth rate to rise from 1.7% in 1936 to a peak
of 4% in 1961, one of the highest in the world.
Institutionalization of rural sanitation
To assure continuity and adequate logistic support,
Gabaldon backed up his “army” of sanitary inspectors
and engineers with an elaborate institutional infrastruc-
ture including the famous Malaria School in Maracay,
and an efficient information network on all important
aspects of rural sanitation. Nearly every village and town
was endowed with its own resident sanitary coordinator.
The Malaria and Rural Sanitation Service was given a
privileged status within the Health Ministry.  Its nucleus
was a group of well-paid and well-trained, public health
professionals which constituted an elite corp within the
public administration.  Gabaldon insisted that even the
lowest secretary and field worker be indoctrinated in the
organization’s values and sense of mission.
Collection and treatment of sewage
In 1962, a separate division, called the “Section for the
Control and Disposition of Waste Water” was created
within the Malaria Service to manage sewer and latrine
construction in the rural areas. Its specific objective was to
“achieve an improvement in health by means of the
construction of systems for the collection of waste water,
designed and constructed in the rural setting, to avoid the
propagation of diseases derived from the incorrect dis-
posal of excrement” (Romero et al, 1985). According to the
first national census in 1936, 64% of rural houses did not
contain any system of excrement disposal. As a result of
the efforts of the Malaria Service, by 1981, this figure had
been reduced to 34%.
Sewer construction
In 1960, only 34 out of the approximately 5000 towns and
villages (of less than 5000 inhabitants) in Venezuela had
a sewer system (Censo, 1990). The coverage of the target
population was probably no more than 1% and certainly
less than 5%. With the impetus provided by the new
institutional support, from 1962 to 1985, 509 new systems
were constructed by the Malaria Service, many with
associated oxidation ponds, raising the estimated cover-
age of the eligible population to around 30% (Romero et
al, 1985).
Latrine building
As a complement to the sewer program, pit latrines were
constructed for the dispersed rural population (see Graph
1). Initially, residents were expected to pay for the latrine
by means of long-term, low-interest loans. Most proved
to be uncollectable and were eventually forgiven by
subsequent governments.
Potable water supplies
As a complement to the improved means of excrement
disposal, rural water systems were constructed begin-
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ning in the 1940’s. Starting from a base of near zero, the
coverage of the population living in settlements of less
than 5000 had risen to 70% by 1985 (Romero et al, 1985).
Sustainability
Despite these promising beginnings, which set Venezuela
apart from most developing countries and seemed to
promise the eventual triumph of modern technology and
organization over the traditional plagues of the tropics, a
process of decay began in the 1980’s which reversed many
of the earlier gains and seriously called into question the
long term viability of this development model.
Sewer usage
As mentioned, sewer construction advanced very rap-
idly, extending the potential coverage to 30% of the
eligible population by mid-1985. However, only 26% of
the houses adjacent to the sewer lines were actually
hooked up by this date (Romero et al, 1985) meaning that
in reality, less than 8% of the eligible population actually
took advantage of the service. Thus, in terms of any health
benefit, a large proportion of this huge investment was
simply wasted.
Sewage treatment
An additional and related problem arose with respect to
sewage treatment. A large number of the originally con-
structed oxidation ponds failed after a few years of service
because of poor design, inadequate maintenance, and
incorrectly estimated sewage flows.
According to Lansdell (1987, p 56), the principal prob-
lems were:
• Vegetation invaded the banks and floor causing smells
and vector breeding. Maintenance budgets would not
cover the expense of clearing and the lagoon was left
to its own devices.
• Initial sewage flow was insufficient to combat evapo-
ration, the lagoon never filled, dense vegetation took
hold, increasing losses through evapotranspiration.
• The inlet sewer was badly designed or vulnerable to
washout by floods.
• Unplanned urban expansion reached to within 10 m
of the lagoon water’s edge. The lagoon became over-
loaded, and smells and insects affected the nearest
house.
Latrines
The latrine construction program declined markedly to-
ward the end of the decade and was all but abandoned by
the 1980’s. This was due in part to the relatively high cost
of the program (Romero, 1985) and in part to a tacit
recognition that latrines came to be regarded by many
potential users as ugly, malodorous sources of disease
and symbols of underdevelopment.
However, another unstated factor was also present. In
the 1980’s, the Health Ministry began massively dosing
the rural population with low-cost, anti-helminth drugs,
such as mebendazol. At a cost of around US $1 per child
per year for drug treatment vs.  a construction cost for
latrines of between US $100 and US $200, it is clear why
many health officials viewed this approach as a more
cost-effective method for attacking the problem of intes-
tinal parasites (Cutting, 1991).
Unfortunately, subsequent research in Venezuela and
elsewhere (Maraven, 1990) has shown that medication,
while certainly effective in treating patients with intesti-
nal parasites, provides only transitory relief. Unless ac-
companied by additional measures such as health educa-
tion, latrines, and improved water supplies, reinfection
takes place very rapidly, completely nullifying the initial
results in a matter of a few weeks (Tanner, et al, 1987).
Thus, drugs do not represent a panacea but rather one
more tool in an integrated approach. Also, promiscuous
use of drugs enhances the risk of developing resistant
strains of the pathogen.
Potable water
Venezuela’s rural aqueducts, which once set the standard
in Latin America, also have deteriorated substantially in
the past 15 years.  Common problems are:
• Capricious and unreliable water treatment; over and
under-dosing with chlorine are common. Water test-
ing frequently reveals the presence of coliforms.
• Most rural water systems rely on diesel pumps which
are notoriously difficult to maintain in rural areas,
resulting in considerable downtime.
• Administration of rural water systems is deficient.
Workers do not get paid on time, supplies arrive late,
routine maintenance is not regularly performed, and
there is little or no effort to collect water bills.
• Water rates are ridiculously low or nonexistent.
Non-sustainability of the model
Why did the rural sanitation campaign in Venezuela,
which showed such promise in its initial stages, prove not
to be sustainable in the longer term? Part of the answer
lies in the vast shift in the population from rural to urban
areas in response to new economic opportunities created
by the burgeoning petroleum industry (see Graph 2). This
phenomenon forced the government to shift priorities
away from the problems of rural development toward the
more pressing problems of urban slums. But there is more
to the story.
Institutional factors
During the decade of the 1970s, Gabaldon progressively
relinquished management and control of the Malaria
Service with various adverse consequences for the or-
ganization, especially in the area of merit promotion.
Increasingly, as in almost all other areas of the public
administration, the Service became less and less profes-
sional and more and more politicized. This coincided
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with increasingly stringent budget restrictions which
tended to undermine pride and dedication to duty.
Financing
The national economy began to suffer substantial re-
verses in the mid-1980’s which led to reduction in the
relative importance of the health sector in general, and the
rural sanitation program in particular. Health as a pro-
portion of the national budget declined from a high of
8.6% in 1970 to a low of 6.1% in 1980.  Whereas the Malaria
Service received nearly 16% of the overall Health Minis-
try budget in 1960, this figure was reduced to only 4% in
1980 (Gali, 1986).
Added to this problem was the progressive impover-
ishment of the rural population.  According to FIDA
(1993), the percentage of rural dwellers in Venezuela
living below the poverty line rose from 36% in 1965 to 58%
in 1988.  Thus, at the same time that public investment
was declining, the population had less and less financial
capacity to solve its own problems.
Paternalism
Oil riches, a marked, cultural affinity for paternalism and
an elaborate system of party-based, political patronage,
have accustomed the Venezuela population to turn to the
government or to the political parties to solve virtually all
problems. This has tended to stunt incipient moves to-
ward greater community organization and cooperation
which have provided the traditional underpinning for
boot-strap programs throughout the developing world.
Thus, both the will and the means for mobilizing self-help
schemes to fill the gap left by the retreating public sector
have been wanting.
Technology
No sanitation system can be effective without user col-
laboration. Lack of attention to consumer concerns and
preferences in the case of latrine design led to a wide-
spread prejudice against the device which now inhibits its
revival in a more appropriate guise.
In the case of water disinfection, a number of techno-
logical and human factors came into play. Most village
water systems incorporated a mechanism for chlorina-
tion based on the use of calcium hypochlorite, although
this chemical was not produced in Venezuela.
Importation was not a problem during the years of the
oil boom, roughly 1973 to 1982, but in the following
period of prolonged economic stagnation, calcium
hypochlorite supplies became scarce. There was no provi-
sion for the use of sodium hypochlorite, which was avail-
able domestically, as an emergency substitute. This weak
link in the chain meant that water quality could not be
guaranteed.  Some consumers responded by applying
home remedies, such as boiling water, particularly when
there were advertised epidemics of parasitic disease or
cholera scares, but most simply adopted a callous, fatal-
istic attitude toward the risk of waterborne disease.
Even when supplies of disinfectant were adequate there
was a problem of dosage control.  Modern dossifiers were
usually installed initially but the combination of lack of
maintenance and timely replacement meant that most
had a very short life.  The low-level, on-site operator was
then left to devise his own, improvised substitute. This
usually consisted of a bucket, a piece of plastic tubing and
a clothes pin. The crudest solution was to pour chlorine
into the water source itself, next to the pump intake,
thereby killing all aquatic life in the stream in the imme-
diate vicinity.
 Inevitably this kind of improvisation produced both
overdosing and underdosing. In the former case, con-
sumers usually rejected the water because of its disagree-
able taste. In the latter case, which was more common, the
amount of residual chlorine was insufficient to provide
contingent protection.
An alternative model
One consequence of the rural exodus was that large
numbers of unskilled, rural migrants clustered in squat-
ter settlements surrounding oil company installations. In
an effort to escape this problem, the companies isolated
themselves behind chain link fences, in self-sufficient
enclaves, featuring all of the conveniences of modern
urban life.
Following nationalization of the industry in 1975, a new
policy was promulgated obliging these oil “camps” to be
integrated with the surrounding communities.
It was quickly realized that this integration, if taken
literally, would impose on oil workers an unacceptable
deterioration in living standards. Therefore, a program
was devised for upgrading basic services in neighbouring
communities and rural areas.
When the Orinoco Bitumen Belt was opened for explo-
ration in 1980, the new community assistance model was
expanded to include water and basic sanitation for rural
villages and towns. This approach was characterized by
the use of appropriate technology (improved oxidation
ponds, rainwater collection systems, individual, water-
monitoring and purification systems), community par-
ticipation (auto-construction with volunteer, community
labour), and technical advice offered by oil company
employees resident in the area.
An integrated approach to the problem of parasite
infection, reminiscent of Gabaldon’s original design, was
devised which included four basic elements:
• VIP latrine construction (self-help)
• improved water supplies
• health education
• diagnosis and treatment of infected patients
with appropriate drugs
The success of this effort prompted the industry to
create, in 1992, the Zumaque Foundation, a private, not-
for-profit, NGO to carry on and extend this work to other
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areas of the country. Accordingly, the Foundation has
been helping campesino and indigenous communities in
selected areas to take more responsibility for their own
welfare and to upgrade sanitary conditions to the level
they can afford and maintain, with limited outside assist-
ance from the oil industry and other sources.
Summary and conclusions
Venezuela represents an interesting case of a tropical
developing country which was an early pioneer in utiliz-
ing modern technology and advances in the science of
public health to effect a revolution in rural sanitation.
Thanks to these efforts, the country made rapid and even
dramatic progress in health and sanitation in its rural
areas in the decades following WW II.
This success proved to be a mixed blessing as it contrib-
uted to a subsequent, explosive growth of the urban
population. Even in the rural areas, these early gains
proved to be transitory, with sanitary conditions largely
reverting to their earlier state. Helminth and other intes-
tinal parasite infections are still present in the majority of
the population. Major infectious diseases, such as ma-
laria, hepatitis, and tuberculosis are on the rise and there
have been sporadic outbreaks of cholera.  Safe water and
adequate excrement disposal are still only available to a
privileged minority.
Clearly, the obstacles, such as poor communications,
illiteracy and lack of infrastructure were of far greater
proportions when the program began back in the 1940s
than at a later date when  the economic and social devel-
opment of the country had proceeded to a more advanced
stage. Why them was this programme initially so success-
ful?
Much of the credit must go to Arnaldo Gabaldon who
almost single-handedly built a rural sanitation empire
which was unique in the developing world at that time.
The coincident development and commercialization of
DDT was also crucial. Oil provided the public sector with
the extra resources to finance the program on a the
massive scale necessary to produce a genuine impact at
the national level. The Rockefeller Foundation and the
World Health Organization also provided key outside
support and international endorsement.
In hindsight, it is clear that Gabaldon´s faith in his own
ability to protect the Malaria Service from the normal
processes of bureaucratization and politicization was
naive. In his haste to produce results, he underestimated
the importance of building an adequate base of support
for rural sanitation at the community level; a flaw which
he recognized late in life (personal communication with
the author’s wife).
These defects in an otherwise outstanding model can
only be corrected by a painstaking effort in health educa-
tion at the grassroots level, using the services of NGOs,
such as the Zumaque Foundation. By diversifying the
sources of financing, relying more on international sup-
port in the form of soft loans, the risk of interruptions in
the program due to the ups and downs of domestic
politics can be minimized. Finally, more attention to the
appropriateness of the technology for the particular set-
ting will help guarantee greater user involvement and
cooperation.
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Graph 1. Venezuela latrine construction
Graph 2. Total poblation
